DICTATOR VIOLATED 3^rd Nov 1988 HOSTAGE CRICES on International water.

By Adam Rasheed Ahmed.

The Maldives Island was free from geo- politics & International TERRORISM when Qayyoom took office 1978.

Dictator has order Indian Military to ATTACK HOSTAGES ONBOARD MV . PROGESS LIGHT(a cargo ship)

which was hostage by PLOTE TERRORIST. The mentioned ship was in Male ’Commercial Shipping Port. When terrorist aware ETA of Indian Army to Male’ International Airport Island called “HULHULE” they took lot of Maldivian on board the ship & smoothly they leave Male’ port .Geographically they have to move near by AIR PORT & left Male’ Port unfortunately by same time Indian Military landed & gave ONE UNIQUE SINGLE SHOT to ship MV.PRIGRESS LIGHT.

Media claimed & questioned DICTATOR about the hostage crisis & attack he mentioned “NO BODY ATTACK’s WE GAVE THEM COUPLE OF WORNIGN SHOTS.”

I was monitoring the situation very closely, the sound of Indian Military ONE & ONLY GUN SHOT to PLOTE TERRORIST in Male’ was fired may be a RPG.

The ship move smoothly & left Male’ & finally left Maldives to International water.

After some negotiation by relevant authority MALDIVES DICTATOR gave green light to Indian Military to attack Ship lot of Maldivian has lost there life on board the ship & the DRAMA was ended for EVER.

Mv.Progree Light under attack , rescue by OPERATION CACTUS. Dictator Dictate the military Command who was based in Capital Male’.

The SAARC region was politically moved in to different direction during 1980’s.The Maldivian government may be fully aware of the situation but not well informed by Qayyoom’s government.

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Ret.Brgr.Mohamed Zahir plays key role to protect NSS hq from Terrorist 1988

Being one of the most enthusiastic members of SAARC, Sri Lanka has, in recent years, been quite disappointed with the inability of the regional body to move forward either in fulfilling its original objectives or meeting new challenges. From Sri Lanka's perspective, SAARC has fallen victim to inter-state politics between the two principal South Asian states, India and Pakistan, who have been rivals from the very beginning of their emergence as modern nation-states.

Maj. Gen Jaleel (then Brig.) at the Pacific Armies Management Seminar in Fiji

Sri Lanka's special affinity with the idea of closer co-operation among South Asian nations runs back to the 1950s where the island nation's foreign policy shifted decisively towards a position which later came to be called non-alignment. There were, of course, occasional deviations from this policy when regimes of the United National Party (UNP)-the most conservative of the post-independence ruling parties-took up an openly pro-American stand on external relations. In the early eighties, there was also a proposal made by some sections of the then ruling UNP that Sri Lanka should join ASEAN. However, all Sri Lankan regimes after the mid-1980’s have demonstrated a clear commitment to the spirit and programme of close South Asian cooperation. Quite significantly, ordinary citizens of Sri Lanka seem to cherish the ideal of South Asian solidarity. That, in a way, represents a kind of citizen-based sense of internationalism.

India and Pakistan in SAARC: Sri Lankan responses

Sri Lanka's political consensus for a strong South Asian regionalism has been shared by non-state civil society actors as well. Particularly after the mid-1990s, there have been a variety of initiatives by women's groups, the media, business and professional bodies as well as trade unions, to link up with their counterparts in the rest of South Asia in programmes of what has been described as the ‘multi-track approach to regional integration’. These initiatives are backed by a strong argument in Sri Lanka to continue to strengthen civil society, people to people contact in South Asia, parallel to and independent of the official process.

Given the history of bickering and inter-state rivalries, particularly between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and her smaller neighbours, on the other, there is also recognition among the intelligentsia in Colombo of the continuing inability of the official SAARC process to transcend bilateral irritants. In a seminar held in Colombo in 2001, Gamani Corea, Sri Lanka's eminent economist, articulated these views quite mildly when he said: 'The political stresses and tensions among the larger members of the region, particularly Indo-Pakistan, has stood in the way of even arranging summits and other meetings. When SAARC was established, it was felt that it would help to defuse political tensions, but there has been only partial success' (Kelegama, 2001: vi).

The SAARC Charter does not allow bilateral issues to enter its official agenda. That has been a deliberate decision made by the founding fathers of SAARC, in order to insulate the newly set-up forum for co-operation from contentious bilateral issues. Even at the first summit in Dhaka this dimension was re-iterated. It was obviously a decision made with exceedingly good intentions, primarily in view of the volatility of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. But the point from the perspective of the regional co-operation is that it is precisely the inability of both India and Pakistan to transcend bilateral tension that has negatively affected any significant progress in the direction of closer regional cooperation and solidarity. In fact, those in Sri Lanka who closely follow the dynamics of South Asian politics often express their anguish that the smaller South Asian nations can hardly push the two giants in the region towards reconciliation that can effectively be translated into regional stability.

Sri Lanka's officials have been quite aware of the difficulties of building regional cooperation in South Asia in a background of unresolved and continuing conflict between India and Pakistan. At the very first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka in 1985, Sri Lanka's President Junius Jayewardene appealed to the fellow heads of state and government to 'trust each other'. Jayewardene reminded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that 'India, the largest in every way, larger than all the rest of us combined, can by deeds and words create the cooperation among us so necessary to make a beginning'.

However, the complex dynamics of bilateral inter-state issues continued to cast a shadow over the progress of South Asian cooperation. Other than the familiar Indo-Pakistan tension, there had emerged by 1985-86 problems in India-Sri Lanka relations too. The Sri Lankan government as well as many Sinhalese nationalists began to be extremely critical of what they thought as India's interference in Sri Lanka's growing ethnic conflict. Prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi adopted a stand which was openly sympathetic to Sri Lanka's Tamil nationalists who were engaged in a secessionist war. The Indian government also dealt with the Sri Lankan government on the ethnic conflict in a manner that gave rise to the argument of regional hegemonism. Quite interestingly, by 1986, when the second SAARC Summit was held in Bangalore, the bilateral tension between India and Sri Lanka too had reached a qualitatively high point. Sri Lanka's President Jayewardene said at the Bangalore Summit: 'We cannot build this association if we allow bilateral issues to grow. If we bring bilateral issues to this forum, then maybe we would be crippled before we could walk…. The SAARC ship has set sail [and] it has started its journey. [T]here should be no mutiny on board' (Jayewardene, 1988). Jayewardene was, of course, referring to the possibility of the Indian government using the SAARC forum to censure Sri Lanka on its harsh military policy towards Tamil civilians.

It is precisely the policy of keeping bilateral issues away from the official SAARC process that has now become a matter of concern. Many Sri Lankan analysts are of the view that unless India-Pakistan relations are improved in a direction of ensuring a tension-free and stable South Asia, there is simply no possibility for a stronger sense of regionalism in South Asia. Sri Lankan analysts have also been watching how both India and Pakistan had occasionally sent out signals of moving into extra-regional alliances at the expense of SAARC. For example, in the late 1990s, there were signs of Pakistan moving towards greater co-operation with West Asia, where Pakistan would find greater cultural affinity and already-existing economic and migrational bonds. Similarly, India's signals for a possible new alliance, or closer economic co-operation, with countries in the Eastern direction are seen in Sri Lanka as suggestions of India's increasing de-emphasis on South Asian regional cooperation.

The absence of a conflict resolution mechanism within South Asia to address bilateral, inter-state issues that are normally excluded from the official SAARC process, has often been noted by Sri Lankan analysts. They have proposed the setting up of such an institutional mechanism for regional conflict resolution, or even amending the SAARC Charter to enable deliberation on bilateral issues. At the very early years of SAARC, a Sri Lankan analyst even proposed a treaty-based regional security framework for South Asia as a mechanism for minimising and managing bilateral tension (Ariyasinghe: 1990). This proposal envisaged the regional security framework to evolve 'a strategic consensus' among the South Asian states in order to ensure regional security in South Asia. Such a regional security framework was also thought necessary in the context of extra-regional orientation that India and Pakistan had developed in the sense of strategic alliances and defence agreements. But, while proposing such a regional security framework, Ariyasinghe also warned that given the specific geo-political dynamics in South Asia, India would perhaps want collective security arrangements to be 'Indo-centric', because of the perception that the smaller SAARC countries might 'gang up' in an effort to contain India's dominance in the South Asian region (Ariyasinghe, 1990: 41-43).

Sri Lanka, India and South Asia

Sri Lanka's relations with South Asia have also been defined to a great extent by the framework within which the island's relations with India have evolved. The fact that India is Sri Lanka's closest neighbour has certainly had political-geographical implications for the nature of relations between the two nations. In Sri Lanka, attitudes towards India have been quite varied and often ambivalent. Both Sinhalese and Tamil communities consider India as their civilisational homeland. Among the Sinhalese, the historiographical belief is that the nation's founders came originally from Eastern India, Bengal. They also believe that they have got the basics of their culture, language and religion from the Aryan North India. Meanwhile, the Tamils, who live in the North as well as the Eastern and Central provinces, consider as their zone of origin the Dravidian South India. This Aryan-Dravidian ideological dichotomy in Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-Tamil relations has also had implications for Sri Lanka's formal, inter-state relations with India. During the Tamil secessionist insurgency, which began in the early 1980s, India took up a position which was sympathetic to and even supportive of the Tamils while being critical of, and even hostile to, Sinhalese-majoritarian Sri Lankan governments. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka's relations with India remained tense and even mutually non-cooperative throughout the 1980s and even early 1990s.

Meanwhile, vicissitudes of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and India's attempts to control the conflict trajectories had a direct impact on the process of South Asian regional co-operation too. Sri Lanka's political leaders in the 1980s had not been quite comfortable with what they thought as India's direct interference with Sri Lanka's internal affairs. India's pro-Tamil nationalist stand also made Sinhalese nationalists quite angry. They propagated the idea that the Indian government had designs to either dismember Sri Lanka through military intervention, or even annex Sri Lanka to the Indian state. Indeed, the Sinhalese nationalist rebellion of 1987-89, which was partly provoked by the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, had an explicitly anti-Indian orientation. Young Sinhalese rebels in waging a bloody insurgency against the Jayewardene regime thought that they were also fighting to liberate the motherland from the Indian 'hegemonic expansionism.'

When Sri Lanka's President Premadasa hosted the SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1991, the Indian government had no hesitation to boycott it. President Premadasa by this time had adequately antagonised the Indian government by forcing India to withdraw her peace keeping troops from the Island and also by undermining, in alliance with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Indo-Lanka Accord signed in 1987 by President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. When the Colombo Summit was held three months later, it was a brief, one-day affair, described by a newspaper cartoonist in Colombo, quite sardonically and in the sports parlance, as a 'one-day international.”

While India-Sri Lanka's relations have improved quite significantly in the 1990s along with changes in political personalities as well as regimes in both countries, Sri Lankan governments have also moved closer towards Pakistan in situations where the relations with India had suffered setbacks. In the mid-eighties, President Jayewardene sought to improve cooperation with Pakistan, indicating that that measure of cooperation could have entailed Pakistani military assistance to Sri Lankan government to fight the Tamil secessionist rebels. In 1999, in a somewhat similar development, President Chandrika Kumaratunga sought and indeed obtained direct Pakistani military assistance when the LTTE rebels threatened to re-capture the Jaffna Peninsula. There was also explicit displeasure among Colombo's official circles that India in 1999 refused to come forward to Colombo government's rescue with military assistance. Thus, Sri Lanka's turning to Pakistan for military assistance has had a complex logic with implications for relations with India.

The ethnic conflict has seen other negative consequences for Sri Lanka's relations with India as well. Particularly in the 1980s under the tutelage of President Jayewardene, Sri Lanka's foreign policy took a specifically pro-Western, or pro-American, direction. There were also attempts at closer cooperation with Singapore, South Korea and South East Asia particularly against the backdrop of Sri Lanka's economic liberalisation, which began in 1978. Meanwhile, in order to strengthen the Sri Lankan state's capacity to fight the counter-insurgency war against Tamil secession, the Jayewardene regime also took steps to re-establish diplomatic and military links with Israel. Israel began to provide military training as well as military hardware for the Sri Lankan state. This development displeased India. Indian officials saw it as a potential challenge to their regional security doctrine which did not allow external actors to enter into the region using the small countries in the neighbourhood.

This backdrop seems to have forced the Indian policy-makers of the Rajiv Gandhi administration to radically re-asses the Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. Instead of letting Sri Lanka move along an autonomous direction of foreign policy that would have run counter to India's own strategic interests, India seems to have decided in 1987 to make a direct intervention in Sri Lanka's conflict. That intervention was designed to enable India to maintain a firm grip as well as control over the trajectories of Sri Lanka's internal, ethnic conflict as well as external relations. The tragic failure of that strategy is, of course, another story.

Sri Lanka in South Asia

Despite Sri Lankan people's rather affectionate stand towards the idea of closer South Asian solidarity and cooperation, that idea does not seem to have a strong material basis. This became quite clear during 2001-02 when there was a great deal of tension between India and Pakistan, even with the possibility of limited nuclear war. There was hardly any protest in Sri Lanka against Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Many Sri Lankans did not seem to be troubled by the possibility of even a conventional war between the two South Asian giants. Sri Lankan people appeared to have thought that as long as Sri Lanka could stay away from the consequences of an Indo-Pakistan war, nuclear or conventional, they could proceed with life as business as usual. In an objective sense, this reveals a sort of island mentality in Sri Lanka, and also a peculiar political culture that has been shaped by so much political violence that even a possibility of disastrous inter-state war in the regional neighbourhood could not outrage the public.

Actually, the material foundations of Sri Lanka's relations with South Asia are almost exclusively limited to the trade relations with India. Economic relations with other South Asian nations remain quite marginal and insignificant. Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Bhutan are not major trading or economic partners for Sri Lanka. Even in the future, Sri Lanka's economy may not find much partnership with these countries. The present trend is for Sri Lanka's greater economic cooperation with India and closer economic integration with the Southern Indian states, particularly Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that Sri Lanka has been in the forefront of pushing for South Asian free trade regime. The fact that Sri Lanka's economy was liberalised long before all the other South Asian economies, enabling it to establish close links with economies outside the South Asian region, has two important implications in this regard. Firstly, Sri Lanka will continue to remain economically distanced from the South Asian countries other than India. Secondly, closer economic integration with India, whose economy is entering a new phase of capitalist development, would be quite easier and possible for Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka's peace process and South Asian politics

From Sri Lankan people's perspective, one area where the failure of SAARC as a regional body of cooperation hasbeen felt quite acutely is the ethnic conflict. SAARC, partly due to the principle of no-bilateralism, has never taken any step towards helping Sri Lanka resolve the conflict. While India's diplomatic and military misadventure in the mid and late eighties only exacerbated the conflict, India's pre-eminent strategic presence in South Asia has also prevented any other country in the region taking an active interest in the Sri Lankan conflict. When the Indian mediation and intervention attempt failed to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, a fairly significant opinion emerged in Colombo that SAARC, either alone or in collaboration with the British Commonwealth, should play a facilitatory-mediatory role in bringing the government and Tamil rebels to the negotiation table. Ideally, SAARC could have pursued the role of a contact group, first facilitating dialogue between the two parties to the conflict and then providing the services of mediation. This opportunity SAARC never explored. Actually, a SAARC initiative for conflict resolution could have commanded a great deal of prestige and legitimacy, and eventually success, in Sri Lanka.

The incapacity of the SAARC to assist one of its member states to resolve its internal conflict has in turn created the space for extra-regional forces to set in motion a highly internationalised conflict resolution process. Sri Lanka's present negotiation process has been facilitated by Norway. The broader peace process is internationally spearheaded by the US and Japanese governments. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other global, multilateral economic institutions are financially backing this initiative. Actually, Sri Lanka at present has a highly globalised peace process to resolve its internal conflict. And no South Asian has sought to be included in this process. This has revealed one of the fundamental weaknesses of SAARC as a regional political process.(Jayadeva Uyangoda is professor and Chair, Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Colombo).

3^rd Nov 1988 PLOTE TERROR ATTACK TO MALDIVES

During 1988 the government of Maldives has it EMBASSY in Colombo without it’s military attaché.

PLOTE

This group was having the largest number of recruits, hence nick named as “Sothu parcel” (Rice

parcel). Its leader Uma Maheswaran was planning to launch a massive frontal assault and hoping

to ‘march’ through the Tamil homeland by defeating the Sinhala forces. For this purpose PLOTE

was buying arms in the international black market without the knowledge of the India but Indians

seized the weapons at Chennai harbour when they arrived. In addition to this blunder,

Santhathiyar released a book called ‘Vangam thantha padam’ (the lessons of Bangladesh) to

‘enlighten’ the Tamils to warn about the Indian involvement in Eelam affairs. The PLOTE bases in

Tamilnadu became torture centers and killing fields for many dissenting cadres. Eventually PLOTE

vanished from Tamileelam without any fight with Tigers. Other militant groups at least fought

with Tigers for their right to participate in the freedom struggle. The PLOTE further disgraced

itself by attempting to overthrow the Maldivian government.

LTTE in 1977. After the disciplinary action in 1979 he was started a new group call PLOTE. He spent several years in Chennai, He returned to Vavuniya in early 1987 and set up a PLOTE camp in Chettikulam. After the internal split between former PLOTE leader Umamaheswaran , Manikathasan and D. Sidhdharthan, Group of PLOTE members killed own Leader Mr. Umamaheswaran in Bambalapitiya, Colombo. Now they are celebrating that day as a PLOTE hero day. Later Manikkadasan became the de facto leader of PLOTE last following an internal power struggle in which two senior members of the organisation were killed. Mr.Umamaheswaran backed attempt to overthrow the government of the Maldives in 1988.

LTTE vs PLOTE

On May 19, 1982, a shootout occurred at about 9:45 p.m. at Pondy Bazaar, Mambalam, Madras between LTTE and PLOTE members. V. Prabhakaran and Raghavan (alias Sivakumar) of the LTTE, armed with revolvers, opened fire on Jotheeswaran and Mukundan (alias Uma Maheswaran) of the PLOTE. In the mid-1970s, both Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran were members of the LTTE. During the gunfire, Jotheeswaran sustained bullet injuries both in his right and left thighs. Mukundan was also shot at but escaped unhurt. The accused V. Pirabhakaran and Sivakumar were arrested and remanded. Both of them were proclaimed offenders of the Sri Lankan government with a reward on their head of Rs. 5 lakhs each.

On May 25, 1982, Uma Maheswaran was arrested near Gummidipoondi railway station. At the time of arrest, he opened fire with his revolver and another case was registered against him under the Indian Arms Act.

In the meantime, on May 23, 1982 Sivaneswaran (alias Niranjan), an accomplice of Mukundan, was also arrested at Saidapet, Madras and an unlicensed revolver seized from him. All these accused remained in custody until August 5, 1982 when they were released by the orders of the court on conditional bail. The LTTE cadres including their leader V.Pirabhakaran had taken up residence at Mylapore Madras, while the leaders and members of the PLOTE had been staying at Saidapet, Madras.

TELO

The TELO organisation was well armed and trained by the Indian government; it was the number

one beneficiary of RAW and Indian military. The UP trained (Uttar Pradesh) TELO cadres staged

few daring assaults on Sinhala forces and made them a force to be reckoned. The TELO posed a

real threat to Liberation Tigers and their dominance in the freedom struggle. The curse of TELO

came in the form of Bobby – Thas clash which split the organisation into regional lines

(Vadamaradchi and rest of the Jaffna). The downfall of TELO started with the massacre of

unarmed Thas and his deputies at the Jaffna teaching hospital in 1986. Later Liberation Tigers

launched a surprise attack on TELO and its infrastructures; in retaliation for a local problem

between the two organisations. The Liberation Tigers captured large cache of arms and

ammunition; eventually they captured and killed Srisabaratnam, the leader of the organisation.

The TELO was the first organisation to be banned by the Tigers.

Maldives had not suffered a foreign invasion since the Portuguese landed in the sixteenth century.

Until last November, the Maldives had not suffered a foreign invasion since the Portuguese landed in the sixteenth century. Little wonder that the trial of the invaders (the more recent ones, that is) is fascinating the people of the tiny Indian Ocean republic. Each day hundreds of Maldivians line the streets of the capital, Male, to watch and jeer at the accused as they are marched to court in handcuffs.

Mr Abdullah Luthufi, a Maldivian businessman and the alleged ring leader of the plot to overthrow the government, has told the court that the invasion fleet of two trawlers sailed from Sri Lanka. On board were mercenaries recruited from the ranks of former fighters for a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. They landed at Male on November 3rd and quickly seized the president’s house and the radio and television stations.

But they failed to capture President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Telephones and the international airport were never disabled. This allowed President Gayoom to call for help, and India to land 1,600 troops in military aircraft later in the day. The bungled takeover left 19 people dead on the streets of Male. At least eight others were killed when the Indian navy moved in and captured the invaders as they fled in hijacked ship.

The 68 Sri Lankans on trial have admitted to being members of the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam, a former separatist group which, despite its pretensions to being a legitimate political party, has become a guns-for-hire organization. In exchange for staging a coup, the organization was to be given a tourist resort in the Maldives to make money from, and the use of Male’s port for gun-running.

The national security service, which has performed little more than guard duties and minor police work, may now be turned into a fighting force. There are still more than 250 Indian paratroops on the islands. Radar equipment may be installed to guard the coastline. Like a household which has been burgled for the first time, the Maldivians may never feel safe again.

Political Writer & Editor / Adam Rasheed Ahmed

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